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ABSTRACT: The integration of the countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe into 
global flows of migration has become a major issue not only in migration policy de-
bates, but also in analysing longer term social change in the region. Changes in the 
magnitudes of migrant remittances can be of crucial social and political importance. In 
this study, I link a conceptual contribution with a three-step empirical inquiry. First, I 
conceptualize migrant remittances as a form of external economic dependency. Next, I 
describe recent changes in the strength of the empirical relationship between migrant 
remittances as percentages of the GDP and per capita GDP for all societies of the 
world utilizing data from two online data sets. Employing what Charles Tilly (1984) 
called “variation-finding comparison,” I examine, next, the – as it turns out, quite 
sizeable – residual variation in the relative magnitude of remittances that remains after 
controlling for per capita GDP, and interpret it as a marker for patterns of remittance 
dependency. Finally, I trace the recent trajectories of the societies that had, until one 
generation ago, constituted the Soviet “bloc” against the backdrop of the global distri-
bution in remittance dependency. 
The data have been adopted from two sources: Estimates for migrant remittances as 
percentages of the GDP of their home country come from the online World Develop-
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ment Indicators dataset of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,3 
while per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP/cap)4 figures have been borrowed from 
economic historian Angus Maddison’s widely used population, GDP and GDP/cap 
dataset.5  
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1  MIGRANT REMITTANCES, “DEVELOPMENT”AND DEPENDENCY 
 
All forms of commerce involve importation and exportation of labour. In 
terms of social conditions and consequences, however, there is a considerable 
difference between those forms of trade where the labour that is exported / 
imported is embodied “only” in the product, and those that involve human be-
ings crossing state borders to exert their labour power as non-citizens. My in-
terest lies in deciphering the economic significance of the latter6 for migrant-
emitting societies – an issue that is emerging, in the context of an ever more 
closely integrated world-economy, as an increasingly serious social, economic 
and political problem.  
Of particular conceptual interest are the experiences of the societies of the 
erstwhile Soviet „bloc” that have experienced the reinstatement of (semi-) 
peripheral capitalism in the years following 1989–1991. They merit special 
attention with respect to migrant remittance dependency (MRD) for three main 
reasons. 
First, because most state socialist states had operated some forms of re-
strictions on the foreign travel of their own citizens, one of the relevant social 
changes the collapse of states socialism brought in was the removal of such 
domestic constraints on flows of all kinds, including labour exports. Of course, 
 
3
 Variable code “BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS,” “Workers' remittances and compensation 
of employees, received (% of GDP), IBRD”.  
4
 Maddison estimates historical GDP/cap figures with the Geary-Khamis method – a ver-
sion of the purchasing power parity (PPP) technique – at current USD. For the analysis, they 
have been translated into annual percentages of the world mean GDP/cap. PPP measures are 
known to have a close covariance with exchange rate (XE)-based measures, and have one 
clear advantage, namely, that they control for differences in real cost-of-living differences 
along the distribution. As a result, the overall variance in the PPP estimates tends to be more 
“conservative” than that of XE-measures; in other words, the rich appear somewhat less rich, 
and the poor somewhat less poor. 
5
 Maddison, 2012. Maddison’s figures are Geary-Khamis PPP estimates, offered in fixed 
1980 USD. For better over-time comparability and easier interpretability as “relative position 
in the global system of economic inequality,” I have converted Maddison’s USD figures to 
percentages of the world mean GDP/cap for the given year. 
6
 Obviously, economic effects constitute only a subset of the many, far-reaching conse-
quences of labour exports. 
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the end of the socialist state’s administrative restrictions on cross-border popu-
lation movements was paralleled by the creation of new barriers, this time by 
the two largest economic entities in the world, the European Union (through the 
seven-year delay in implementing the free movement of labour with respect to 
citizens of the newly admitted member states) and the United States (which 
introduced a similar delay in the implementation of the visa-free travel ar-
rangement to citizens of the recent EU-member states, explicitly expecting that 
the latter would be more likely to overstay the 3-month period of stay than 
others). Those obstacles have since been removed in a subset of those states, 
and only with considerable hesitation, foot-dragging, and delays (Böröcz, 
2014). Even today, i.e., more than ten years after formal accession of the first 
batch of erstwhile-state-socialist states in the European Union – the presence of 
the East European EU-member states’ citizens in the labour markets, and, more 
broadly, in the formal and informal social spaces, of at least some other EU-
member states is subject to considerable political resistance and consternation. 
Second, all post-state-socialist economies sustained deep losses in economic 
output (Böröcz, 2012) over the first two decades after the transformation. Pre-
cipitating severe drops in incomes and a massive reduction of the labour force, 
the downward slide of post-state-socialist societies produced powerful incen-
tives for labour to seek employment abroad, and for post-state-socialist econo-
mies to export labour power.  
Third, the post-state-socialist transformation in the erstwhile Soviet-bloc re-
sulted in the multiplication of three formerly federal states: Czechoslovakia 
broke up into two, the end of Yugoslavia created seven successor states, and the 
breakdown of the USSR produced no fewer than fifteen, at least nominally 
independent, post-Soviet polities. The state-socialist era administrative category 
of residency registration thus came to be re-inscribed as citizenship. One con-
clusion was the sudden creation of a sizeable cohort of “foreign” workers 
(Böröcz, 2014). The forced population displacements that resulted from the 
four post-Yugoslav wars and the various civil and international wars in Central 
Asia and around the Caucasus region further swelled the ranks of erstwhile-
socialist labour abroad. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the rela-
tionship between labour exports and the economic performance of the migrant-
emitting societies would show some particularly strong patterns in the post-
state-socialist context.  
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Source: Ratha and Silwal (2012). 
Figure 1 
Remittances and other resource flows to developing countries, 1990–2010 
 
 
The idiomatic expression referring to the focal variable of my analysis, ‘re-
mittance dependency’ is widely used7 in the literature on transnational / interna-
tional migration. To be noted, however, is that the term often appears without a 
definition, making the idea suggestive but also rendering it inaccessible to em-
pirical examination. 
Another feature of the literature is that the use of the expression “remittance 
dependency” is somewhat undifferentiated in terms of scales: In some instances 
it refers, clearly, to the micro- and/or meso-scale, denoting families of migrants 
that experience dependence on remittances; at other places, it designates a mac-
ro-level phenomenon, referring to entire societies / states / economies as subject 
to such dependency. Dependency due to transnational integration involving 
smaller scales (e.g., households, other formal or informal institutions or indi-
viduals) might be of great conceptual interest, but we lack reliable global com-
parative data on those scales. Here, my conceptual interest and data refer to the 
macroscopic scale. 
 
 
7
 See, e.g., Keely and Tran (1989), Guarnizo (2003), Hujo and Piper (2007), Koppenberg 
(2012) or Thieme (2012). 
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The “migration-development nexus” is a ubiquitous concern for studies in 
international migration. To be sure, global structures of capital-labour relations 
ensure that the remuneration of foreign labour – likely the least protected, most 
precarious, often systematically discriminated-against and overall most exploit-
ed segment of the working classes of the world – remains very low. Hence, the 
remittance flows generated by non-citizen labour are relatively insignificant 
when compared to the total volume of the world economy, or even if measured 
against the economic output of the migrant-receiving, often high-income, socie-
ties. But that does not mean that those sums are equally insignificant for the 
migrants’ home societies. 
The last decade has seen considerable growth in remittances: After two dec-
ades of near-stagnation around the 0.4% level, the sum total of migrant savings 
sent home by the approximately 3% of the world’s population that is foreign-
born8 increased from 0.44% to 0.75% of the Gross World Product during the 
first eleven years of the 21st century.9 
As data presented in a recent Migration and Development Brief, published 
by the World Bank (Ratha and Silwal, 2012; reproduced here as Figure 1 
above), suggest, the estimated total volume of migrant remittances surpassed 
the magnitude of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 1996 and re-
mained higher ever since. Worldwide remittances overtook private debt and 
portfolio equity in 2008 and the steepness of the curve indicating growth in 
migrant remittances since the mid-nineties is comparable to the rate of increase 
in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the same period. World Bank ex-
perts Dilip Ratha and Ani Silwal forecast that by 2014 the sum of worldwide 
migrant remittances will reach the levels that FDI had in 2006 and 2010. To the 
extent that it is necessary to understand aid dependency and foreign direct in-
vestment dependency a major structural problems for some of the poorest and 
least powerful societies of the world, the sheer magnitudes of, and the increas-
ing trends in, migrant remittances – which show amounts comparable to OAD 
and FDI – suggest that dependence on transfers resulting from labour exports 
deserves scholarly attention as well.  
Over the most recent years, global remittances have shown considerable 
fluctuation – likely a short-term effect of the global crisis of 2008. However, 
even if we take this volatility into account, the overall growth in remittances 
has been remarkably strong. As Table 1 suggests, the upswing in remittances to 
the states that the World Bank categorizes as the “Third World” has been con-
 
8
 According to the World Development Indicators dataset, the total foreign-born popula-
tion (SM.POP.TOTL) of the world increased from 178.1 to 213.3 million people. The World 
Bank estimates that that comprises 2.92% to 3.11% of the total world population 
(SM.POP.TOTL.ZS) between 2000 and 2010 (IBRD, 2012).  
9
 The exact meaning of ’remittances’ and a number of methodological remarks on the 
remittance data are presented below in the section of ”Data Caveats.” 
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siderably more robust than the overall rate of growth in the world economy, 
irrespective of whether the latter was estimated via Gross National Income 
(GNI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is particularly striking, given 
the likelihood that the data on which these computations are based likely un-
derestimate the magnitude of the remittance flows (for more on that issue, see 
below).  
 
Table 1 
Rates of growth in total remittances to the Third World  
and global economic growth (%) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
     
Growth in remittances to Third World 16.10 -6.30 5.70 10.510 
Total GNI growth (annual %)11 1.20 -2.57 4.47 .. 
Total GDP growth (annual %)12 1.33 -2.25 4.34 2.73 
 
Source: For remittances: Ratha and Silwal (2012); for GNI and GDP: IBRD 2012. 
 
The number of states receiving relatively high levels of migrant remittances 
also shows a dramatic increase. While the number of the world’s societies 
where migrant remittances exceeded 10% of the GDP of the migrant emitting 
 
10
 Estimate for the first half of 2011. 
11
 Variable code: NY.GNP.PCAP.CD . “GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the 
gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divid-
ed by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus 
any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of 
primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calcu-
lated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for 
comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official ex-
change rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually 
applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a 
special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion 
factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted 
for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries 
(France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these 
countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.” 
12
 Variable code: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.”  
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state13 had remained at or below five until 1990,14 that number doubled by 
1999,15 only to double again by 2004. It has hovered above twenty ever since.16  
As a result, the percentage of the world’s states with high levels of MRD ex-
ceeded 15% by 2004, and has remained on that level ever since.  
 
 
 
Source: Computed from IBRD. 
 
Figure 2 
Percent of the world’s states with MRD above 10% of GDP, 1980–2010 
 
 
 
13
 10% is of course an arbitrary threshold. I use it here to illustrate the changes in the 
magnitude of the situation. See also Helmke (2010). 
14
 Computed from IBRD 2012. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
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Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of this transformation in percentage terms. 
Starting from around 5% of the world’s societies in the 1980s, the share of 
states with high levels of MRD has increased to 16.8% by 2004, and has re-
mained 15% since then. With rates of increase that have surpassed the growth 
rates of the world economy as a whole, it is undeniable that migrant remittances 
constitute an increasingly significant form of cross-border value transfers. In 
migrant remittances, we are looking at a key component of global economic 
integration. 
 
 
 
Source: Computed from IBRD. 
 
Figure 3 
Remittances: medians, unweighted means and coefficients of variation (stand-
ard deviation / mean), 1980–2010 
 
As the continuous blue line – representing the unweighted world mean re-
mittance/GDP figures – in Figure 3 indicates, the world mean in remittances as 
percentages of the GDP remained more or less constant around 3% until the 
second half of the nineteen nineties. Thereafter, it shows quite a sudden, dy-
namic upswing: It reached 4.5% in 2004, stayed above 4% ever since. The 
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median in worldwide remittances per GDP also shows a proportionate increase 
so that, at its peak in 2007, half of the world’s states show a remittance depend-
ence greater than 1.9% – a figure almost three and a half times greater than this 
period’s minimum in 1986. Meanwhile, the distribution of the world’s societies 
in terms of remittance levels became considerably tighter over the same period: 
The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) among the world’s so-
cieties in terms of the relative importance of migrant remittances has less than 
halved (dropping from above 3 to around 1.5) since the early eighties. As the 
share of migrant remittances in GDP grew and variation among the world’s 
societies sharply decreased, some observers – mainly neoliberal economists – 
came to expect that increased remittances would by necessity lead to a percep-
tible surge in “economic development” in the migrant-emitting societies. 
And yet – in spite of the indications of growth and the expectations based 
upon them – as Alejandro Portes has pointed it out, “[t]here is no known in-
stance of remittances economically “developing” by themselves a labour-
exporting country” (2007, p.20). In fact, remittance dependency is widely re-
ported to entail a number of consequences that can only be described as con-
ceptual opposites to what reasonable observers would define as “development”: 
Repatriated migrant savings are reported to have contributed to lowering politi-
cal participation (Krilova, 2008); they seem to have increased only immediate 
consumption and inflation (Guarnizo, 2003), forcing “land use changes from 
agricultural production to cattle ranching” (ibid.), and, at least under some con-
ditions, to “serious[ly] distort[ing] the local labour market,”17 “displac[ing] 
local jobs and incomes, inducing [. . .] foreign imports [. . .] creat[ing] disparity 
and envy between recipients and nonrecipients, and creat[ing] a culture of eco-
nomic dependency” (Vertovec, 2004, p.985).  
Facing such adverse effects, as Douglas S. Massey and his collaborators 
(1998) report, “nobody [among officials of inter-governmental organizations] 
believes [...] any more” in the possibility of an unambiguous causal connection 
leading from remittances to development. The “rapid growth in remittances to 
less-developed countries”18 ought to be seen, then, in another, more complex, 
conceptual framework.  
To solve the impasse regarding the developmental effects of remittances, 
Castles and Delgado-Wise propose the idea of “the migration-development 
nexus” (2007, p.7), devised to transcend the traps of the “nonsensical [discus-
sion about] what comes first” (Castles, 2009) in the relationship between cross-
 
17
 Guarnizo (2003), summarizing findings, for the Dominican Republic, by Grasmuck 
and Pessar (1991) and, for El Salvador, by Lungo and Kandel (1999) and Zilberg and Lungo 
(1999). 
 
18
 Ghosh (2006) and World Bank 2006, quoted non-verbatim by Castles and Delgado-
Wise (2007, p.7). 
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border flows of labour and economic development.19  Migrant remittances offer 
an excellent empirical focus for such an inquiry, as they constitute an institu-
tionalized instance of the “migration-development nexus“. By focusing on the 
relative magnitudes of remittances at various levels of economic performance, 
we have empirical observations concerning patterns of migration and patterns 
of economic integration jointly, as elements of a single social fact.  
The scholarly literature on global structures and inequalities conceived, on 
the most generic level, the idea of ‘dependency’ to grasp “an unequal relation-
ship between societies” (Foran, 2012, p.383) that “shapes the nature of devel-
opment” (ibid.). A classic definition of economic dependency, proposed most 
elegantly by Theotonio dos Santos in 1968, apprehends “dependence [as] a 
situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the de-
velopment and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” 
(dos Santos 1970, 231; dos Santos 1968, 6). In more formal terms, dependency 
obtains in situations where entire societies are tied to other societies in such 
ways that the linkages between them are considerably more important to some 
than to others.  
Dependency is, thus, an unequal network relationship depicted from the 
standpoint of the society that experiences significantly less network power. 
Viewed through a network ‘lens,’ the world economy is but a set of asymmet-
rical network ties, and the significance of those linkages is exceedingly rarely, 
if ever, balanced, or equal, for all societies involved.20 Simply, experience sug-
gests that, in the capitalist world economy, various dimensions of dependency 
tend to be clustered.21  
From this perspective, I define migrant remittance dependency (MRD) as 
that aspect of the dependence of a society on the economic, political, and social 
conditions prevalent in a set of other societies which results from value trans-
 
19
 Castles and Delgado-Wise (2009) find this discussion “nonsensical” because “socio-
economic change and human mobility are constantly interactive processes” (p.1), making it 
impossible to separate the mutual effects of the two empirically. 
20
 This is not necessarily and always a devastating socio-economic and -political prob-
lem: Small discrepancies in network power can be, and are, routinely absorbed, especially 
given the historic expectations that such external networks will, eventually, over time, pro-
vide possible avenues for a more equal relationship. However, magnitudes do matter, and it 
is also the case that true reciprocity in dependency – where society A and society B are by 
and large to the same extent, symmetrically dependent on each other in multiple dimensions 
– is almost un-heard-of. 
21
 Because of the tendency of asymmetrical ties to cluster, it is possible to regard the ex-
ternal dependency of society A as a structural condition, even without necessarily specifying 
which alters (societies B, C, D, etc.) A is dependent on. It is this insight that led, among 
other developments, to recognition of the importance of the existence and character of exter-
nal linkages in explaining chronic problems of economic growth, industrialisation, and (in-
ternal as well as external) inequalities. 
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fers by its own citizens who sell their labour power abroad.22 Just like depend-
ency on aid or on foreign direct investment, remittance dependency is a process 
whereby external structural conditions are internalized so that the migrant emit-
ting society loses much of its control over its domestic economic, political, 
social, etc., processes.  
Remittance dependency can be thought of as a ratio-scale variable: It is that 
percentage of the GDP of the migrant-emitting economy which is accounted for 
by migrant remittances. “High-MRD” obtains when the economic importance 
of remittances into a society by people from that state who work abroad is high. 
As with most empirical measures, of course there is no a priori way to deter-
mine what constitutes a “high” level but, given sharp differences in magnitudes, 
finding a society consistently in the top segments of distributions signals the 
likely presence of MRD.  
 
 
2   DATA CAVEATS 
 
While migrant remittances are, clearly, network phenomena, network data 
are not available anywhere in an even remotely comprehensive fashion.23 All 
the World Bank World Development Indicators dataset – to my knowledge, the 
best globally comprehensive source of information on remittances available to 
scholars – allows us to do is model some consequences of network linkages 
without network data.24 The analysis I am presenting below focuses essentially 
 
22
 There appears to be such a degree of agreement about the existence, and significance, 
of remittance dependency that, while a large number of studies – e.g., Keely and Tran, 1989; 
Guarnizo, 2003; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Koppenberg, 2012; Thieme 2012 – use a notion of 
remittance dependency, they do not offer a formal definition for it, nor do they specify its 
origins.  
23
 The only example of a study that uses network data I have found, Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2006), works with data for 11 remittance destination states, linked to 3 to 31 alters. 
This creates a small and very uneven sub-matrix of the 200 by 200 state-to-state matrix that 
is the world economy. 
24
 The description of the relevant variable – “Workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees, received (% of GDP)”, variable code: BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS . – reads as 
follows:  Workers' remittances and compensation of employees comprise current transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are the sum of 
three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: workers' 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. Remittances are classified 
as current private transfers from migrant workers resident in the host country for more than a 
year, irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients in their country of origin. Mi-
grants' transfers are defined as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the 
host country for more than one year that is transferred from one country to another at the 
time of migration. Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who have lived in 
the host country for less than a year (IBRD, 2012). 
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on that endpoint of a network process where the savings of non-citizen workers 
abroad enter the migrant emitting society. This allows, clearly, only a first step 
toward an analysis of migrant dependency because, given the absence of infor-
mation on specific remittances by source state, it is impossible to calculate 
pairwise, state-to-state rates of dependency on remittances. However, the data 
do allow calculating the degree of the dependency of a specific economy on the 
external linkages that emerge as a result of the exportation of its citizens’ la-
bour power. 
More problematic, the World Bank data set includes only formal-sector 
transfers, i.e., it provides no information on remittances transferred through 
informal channels. This is quite a serious problem because – as the literature on 
international migration and migrant transnationalism25 has insisted for quite 
some time – a considerable part26 of migrant remittances never enter formal 
financial institutions. We ought to expect this to be the case with most migrants 
that find employment in the informal sector, and at least some of even those 
who are engaged in the formal sector. The powerful involvement of “labour 
supply companies,” recruiting agents and touts – i.e., almost always informal 
components of the value chains in the labour export industry that have every 
reason to conceal their activities (Sarkar, 2012) – is likely further to decrease 
the visibility of at least some of the related monetary flows into the migrant-
emitting economies. As a result, the World Bank data definitely undercount the 
phenomenon they purport to represent.  
Worse yet, there is reason to expect that the magnitude of the undercount is 
systematically related to the level of per capita income: Because of a host of 
social, political and cultural reasons, not to mention the widely noted27 lower 
transaction costs of informal-sector banking services, the undercount is likely to 
become more pronounced as we proceed from the richer to the poorer receiving 
societies. This also raises the possibility that at least some of the recorded 
changes in reported levels of remittances may be the result of migrants switch-
ing between institutional arrangements, some of which might involve shifts 
 
25
 See, e.g., Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999); Landolt, Autler and Baires (1999); Pu-
ri and Ritzema (1999); de Haas (2007); Zelizer (2007). 
26
 According to one World Bank estimate, reported by Ratha and Shaw (2007), “the true 
size of these flows, taking into account unrecorded flows through formal and informal chan-
nels, is believed to be at least 50 percent larger” than estimates based only on formal sector 
transfers. (See also Awal, 2011.) 
27
 Freund and Spatafora (2005, p.5), considers information concerning the lower transac-
tion costs in the informal sector “anecdotal”; meanwhile, in the next paragraph, they assert 
without any qualification that “[f]ormal remittance channels are typically more expensive” 
(Freund and Spatafora 2005, p.5). 
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between the formal and informal sectors.28 Some of the state-by-state differ-
ences may also stem from institutional variation in the transmission of funds 
along the formality-informality distinction, and there is no way to account for 
these effects empirically. 
Finally, yet another caveat is at order: The World Bank has presented its 
remittances data without disclosing its sources or the specific techniques used 
in obtaining / estimating them. That is a serious cause for concern, given the 
great worldwide variation in the ways in which national banks and other central 
financial authorities are able, and willing, to monitor banking activity. This is 
especially so in the case of financial transfers – such as migrant remittances – 
that dwarf, for the most part, in comparison to other cross-border financial 
transactions. 
We should keep all these caveats in mind. The validity of the analysis below 
rests on the assumption that the data we do have are robust enough to withstand 
the damage caused by the obvious imperfections at the source in order to yield 
meaningful results. 
 
 
3  EMPIRICAL EXPECTATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The dependent variable is a single ratio-scale distribution of the world’s so-
cieties in terms of percentages of their GDP that is accounted for by officially 
recorded migrant remittances. According to the precepts of a neoclassical-
inspired “push-pull” model of migration (e.g., Adams, 2008; Glytsos, 1997), 
we should expect, ceteris paribus, strong negative covariance between migrant 
remittances and levels of income at the migrant-emitting societies.29 That is a 
reasonable expectation because, first, as “push-pull” theories would argue, 
individuals in poor societies have greater incentives to go abroad to search for 
work than their colleagues in richer societies. In addition, the lower the position 
of the migrant emitting economy on the global income scale, the more opportu-
nities there are for labour to find more highly remunerated positions. Amplify-
ing this effect is the likelihood that, once incomes are earned, migrants’ savings 
 
28
 Freund and Spatafora (2005) raises the possibility that recorded higher levels may be 
artifacts of a movement toward the formal sector – but, from a sociological point of view, 
there is no a priori reason to exclude the obverse, i.e., that recorded drops may be results of a 
movement toward the informal sector. 
29
 To be noted is that “most – but not all of the results” presented by Adams (2008, p.17) 
suggest an “inverted U-shape” relationship between remittances and per capita GDP – how-
ever, this is not directly relevant because Adams’ dependent variable is remittances per 
capita (not remittances as % of the GDP). 
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go farther in terms of purchasing power in the poorer “home” economies than 
in their less poor counterparts.30  
Summarizing the tradition of sociological critiques in 1989, Alejandro 
Portes and József Böröcz (1989) offered a critique of the conceptual weakness-
es of the “push-pull” paradigm by suggesting that it incorporated a selection 
bias fallacy: “The tendency of the push-pull model to be applied to those flows 
which are already taking place conceals its inability to explain why similar 
movements do not arise out of the other equally ‘poor’ nations or why sources 
of outmigration tend to concentrate in certain regions and not in others [. . .]” 
(Portes and Böröcz 1989, p.607). The present study allows an explicit empirical 
examination, not only of the explanatory power of this empirical expectation 
but, more important, also of the empirical dispersion of the world’s societies in 
terms of the degree of their dependence on migrant remittances, at similar lev-
els of per capita GDP.  
As a first step, let us examine the shape of the distribution of the magnitude 
of migrant remittances according to per capita GDP for 2008.31  
Quantifying the economic impact of non-citizen labour on labour exporting 
states for 2008, Figure 4 strongly confirms the critique of the “push-pull” para-
digm put forth by Portes and Böröcz (1989). As the vertical spread of the dots 
representing the world’s societies indicates, the relative importance of migrant 
remittances covers a wide range, even after controlling for overall level of in-
come (measured as per capita GDP along the horizontal axis). For instance, 
around the median per capita GDP (at 58.3% of the world mean per capita 
GDP in 2008),32 we find (see Figure 4) that societies dispersed on a range be-
tween 0.155% and 23.8%, i.e., the distribution shows a width of over 150 
times. At other levels of per capita GDP, Figure 2 shows even broader disper-
sion in remittances. 
 
 
 
30
 E.g,. Poonam Gupta spells out the precepts of a neoclassical perspective on migration, 
savings and remittances as follows: “one can think of an optimising framework whereby a 
migrant maximizes his utility by choosing the optimal level of his own consumption, remit-
tances to family in his native country for their consumption needs, and investment in various 
available instruments in the native country as well as in the host country.” (2006, p.2772). 
31
 2008 is the most recent data year for which both remittance and GDP estimates are 
available at the time of the writing of this study. 
32
  Medians in both dimensions are marked by straight black lines in this and all subse-
quent graphs. 
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Source: Computed from Maddison and IBRD. 
 
Figure 4 
Relative wealth and MRD, states of the world, 2008  
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
20 JÓZSEF BÖRÖCZ  
 
Table 2 
Percent of variance in remittance dependence explained by GDP/cap  
(R2 yielded by univariate regression, select years) 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
        GDP/cap as % of world 
mean 
0.00933 0.01134 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.135 0.169 
 
Source: IBRD, World Development Indicators and Maddison.  
 
Table 2 reports the strength of the relationship between per capita GDP and 
MRD between 1980 and 2008 – the entire period for which relevant data are 
available. Throughout the period, R2-levels are remarkably low. There appears 
to be a certain tendency of over-time increase as we approach the more recent 
time points. I do not have a specific explanation for this apparent empirical 
regularity, but it is amply evident that even the highest R2-s leave more than 
four-fifths of the variation in the level of migrant remittances un-explained. In 
other words, clearly, the most exciting aspect of the relationship between mi-
grant remittances on the one hand and levels of economic performance on the 
other is not their weak, negative covariance – the only regularity expected on the 
basis of the central insight of the “push-pull” paradigms – but the wide dispersion 
in migrant remittance levels after controlling for relative wealth. Of great concep-
tual importance is the empirical regularity that even relatively rich countries can 
also be dependent on remittances. This wide dispersion might actually mean that 
various social groups of rich countries also manoeuvre in the global economy and 
thus development migration nexus is to be rethought.  
 
Table 3 
Regimes of remittance dependency (MRD) 
 
 Low per capita GDP High per capita GDP 
   High remittance dependency Poor – high MRD Rich – high MRD 
Low remittance dependency Poor – low MRD Rich-low MRD 
 
 
Conceptually, the wide dispersion of remittance levels and their low sensi-
tivity to control for per capita GDP allows consideration of various regions of 
this plot as distinct types of insertion in the global system of economic integra-
tion. In the rest of this study, I shall interpret these distinct locations as distinct 
regimes of remittance dependency. At the simplest, we can distinguish, as does 
Table 3, between high and low levels of dependency along poor and rich mi-
 
33
 The effect points in the direction opposite the expectation. 
34
 The effect points in the direction opposite the expectation. 
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grant emitting states. In terms of this typology, the “push-pull” expectation 
would be that most cases fall in the top-left and bottom-right cells of this ta-
ble.35 Our alternative perspective opens up the question of where in this typolo-
gy given societies fall – and examines the question empirically. Intuitively, it is 
reasonable to expect sharp contrasts in the available economic policy, geopolit-
ical strategy, as well as labour, educational, pension and other social policy, etc. 
options for two states with approximately identical levels of per capita GDP 
where migrant remittances constitute, say, 12% of the GDP of one and 0.12% 
of another. As Figure 2 and Table 2, above, suggest such contrasts do, clearly, 
exist at virtually all levels of national income. 
 
 
4  TRAJECTORIES IN POST-STATE-SOCIALIST REMITTANCE 
DEPENDENCY 
 
The post-state-socialist transformation of the erstwhile Soviet ”bloc” produced 
27 states. The erstwhile-state-socialist countries cover the world map in a fully 
contiguous manner from the former East German-West-German border and the 
eastern borders of Finland, Austria and Italy through the Pacific Ocean.36 This 
political transformation made available approximately 8.14% of the world’s 
population,37 and added altogether circa 10.4% of the gross world product38 at 
the time, to that part of the global productive assets of humankind that is valor-
ised by global capital without interference by a socialist state.  
In the remainder of this study, I examine the trajectories of these 27 post-
state-socialist societies in two batches: the states of (South-) Eastern Europe 
(referred to in the graphs as (S)EE) and the successor states of the USSR.39 I 
examine the trajectories of these two groups of states at four time points: 
1996,40 2000, 2005 and 2008.41 I keep the distributions for the rest of the world, 
marked by small black dots, in the background of the graphs. 
 
35
 Further to aid orientation in this map of global positions, I also include a univariate 
power regression line in each graph – a visual aid that can be interpreted as the set of ex-
pected values under the “push-pull” perspective. 
36
 The German Democratic Republic has been incorporated into the Federal Republic of 
Germany and neither the IBRD (2012) nor the Maddison (2008) datasets provide estimates for it. 
37
 Computed from Maddison, 2012. 
38
 Computed from Maddison, 2012. 
39
 Of the post-Soviet states, remittance data are missing for Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan, reducing the number of the post-Soviet data points to 13. 
40
 This is the earliest year for which a reasonable number of data for the post-state-
socialist states is available in the IBRD data set. 
41
 This is the most recent year for which the Maddison data set offers estimates of per 
capita GDP. 
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Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
Figure 5 
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 1996,  
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
As Figure 5 indicates, Albania (AL) – the poorest of this lot of post-state-
socialist states – was already among the world’s most highly remittance-
dependent societies by the time it began reporting remittance information to the 
World Bank in 1996. We find the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(MK), as well as Croatia (HR), and Slovenia (SI) also in the top half (i.e., above 
the horizontal straight line representing the global median for the given year) of 
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the global distribution.42 Closest to the median are Poland (PL) and Bulgaria 
(BG), followed, from some distance, by Hungary (HU). Meanwhile, Slovakia 
(SK) and Romania (RO) are definitely in the low-RMD segment of the distribu-
tion. The regression line illustrating the strength of per capita GDP in predicting 
world-wide variance in MRD is almost entirely flat, with a negligible R2. 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
Figure 6 
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2000  
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
 
42
 This could well be, to some extent, the effect of the dissolution of the federal state of 
Yugoslavia. (For more on the impact of the collapse of the erstwhile-state-socialist states on 
the global system of labour migration, see Böröcz, 2014).  
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By 2000, we see (in Figure 6) the definite signs of a rearrangement.  For the 
first time, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) reported data for this year and, with its 
remittances accounting for just a notch below 30% of its GDP, it is instantly 
one of the world’s most migrant remittance dependent societies. Romania’s 
MRD increased more than ten-fold, from 0.025% to 0.26% of its GDP, during 
the four years elapsed – but, even with this increase, Romania was still among 
the less remittance-dependent societies of the world in 2000. Poland has moved 
up to the median of the global distribution of MRD, somewhere halfway be-
tween the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovenia. The remaining societies of the 
region registered no perceptible movement. 
 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 7 
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2005  
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
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In 2004, the European Union underwent what is referred to as the “Big 
Bang” enlargements. As part of this expansion, five states of (South-) Eastern 
Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) were 
formally admitted43 in the EU. It is quite a surprising insight about the dynam-
ics of remittance dependency that – contrary to some alarmist and xenophobic 
rhetoric warning that the EU would be “flooded” by “Polish plumbers”44 and 
other temporary labour migrants from the newly acceded lands – only one state 
in the region, Slovakia experienced a noteworthy increase in RMD up till 2005 
by going from well below to considerably above the global median (its remit-
tances increased from 0.06% to 1.54% of the GDP), showing a more than twen-
ty-five-fold jump. Although the other states in this region show only moderate 
increases, all states of Southern and Eastern Europe have moved to or above the 
regression line by 2005. To be noted also is that it is at this point – i.e., at the 
point where the former-state-socialist societies of eastern Europe joined the EU 
– that the R2 estimating the significance of per capita GDP for migrant remit-
tance dependency jumps to a non-trivial 13.5%, possibly signalling the im-
portance of eastern Europe’s EU-membership for increasing the total amount of 
global inequality and, more specifically, dependency. 
To be noted, however, is that, other than Slovakia, Eastern Europe’s highest 
increases in MRD were registered in Romania (jumping from 0.26% to 4.78% 
of the GDP, an uptake of more than 18 times) and Bulgaria (which shot from 
0.45% to 5.58%, an over 12-fold increase) – i.e., states that were not among 
those admitted to the European Union’ in 2004 yet.45 Viewed in the context of 
the world, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Poland occupied a position almost 
exactly on or, as with the Czech Republic, somewhat below, the global median 
of RMD, while not-yet-EU-member Romania and Bulgarian already joined 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) and Macedonia – i.e., states of the region 
that had already been in the high-MRD category. 
Meanwhile, by 2005, it became clear that Slovenia had a trajectory that was 
the exact opposite of the rest of Eastern Europe. The region’s wealthiest and 
smallest state began its migrant remittance experience at relatively high levels, 
registering an RMD of 1.03% in 1996. However, while most other societies of 
 
43
 To be noted is that, with respect to labour migration, most already-EU-member states 
imposed a seven-year ban on the new entrants so, at least in theory, one ought to have ex-
pected a relatively minor effect on remittances until 2011, when the bans expired.  
44
 The xenophobic public debates about east European migrants supposedly “inundating” 
western Europe unfolded with a particular viciousness in France, in the context of the debate 
on the European Constitutional Treaty (Favell, 2008) and in Britain over the latter govern-
ment’s decision not to restrict labour migration to citizens of the newly-admitted EU-
member states (Martyniak, 2006). About the emerging, longue-durée moral-geopolitical 
patterns of ‘European difference’, see Böröcz (2006) and Melegh (2006). 
45
 Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the EU took place on January 1, 2007, and in-
volved seven-year bans on the movement of labour, similar to all other “eastern” entrants. 
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the region experienced an upward-pointing trajectory or began high and stayed 
high (as most other successor states of the former Yugoslavia), Slovenia started 
moving down such that, by 2005, its MRD was 0.74%, a figure that put it well 
below the global median and almost exactly on the global regression line. 
 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 8  
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2008  
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
By 2008, we see (as in Figure 8) the culmination of the trends that began 
during the previous period. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Romania, 
Macedonia and Bulgaria each show high MRD levels, Croatia, Hungary, Slo-
vakia and Poland hover around the median, and the Czech Republic has joined 
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Slovenia as the other exception in Eastern Europe, of states with low MRD. 
With their figures at 0.63% and 0.64%, respectively, they show almost exactly 
the value expected on the basis of the “push-pull” perspective.  
 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 9 
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 
1996 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
It is a testimony to the complexities of the post-Soviet landscape that the da-
ta representing the MRD of the successor states of the former USSR46 (present-
ed in Figure 9) start with a remarkably wide dispersion. In 1996, Armenia’s 
 
46
 The post-Soviet states are marked by circles in the graphs. 
28 JÓZSEF BÖRÖCZ  
 
(AM) MRD level already stands at 5.25% of the GDP, while Ukraine (UA) 
registers 0.013%, showing a difference between two former-Soviet successor 
states of over 400 times. Next to Armenia, we find Moldova (MD) and Latvia 
(LT) also considerably above the global median, with Belarus (BY), Lithuania 
(LV) and Russia (RU) around the intersection of the median and the regression 
line. Slightly below them, well beneath the global median, we see Kazakhstan 
(KZ), Kyrgyzstan (KS), Azerbaijan (AZ), Estonia (EE) and Ukraine (UA). 
Particularly noteworthy are the positions of Ukraine, Estonia and Azerbaijan, 
because they are particularly far below the regression line, clearly among the 
world’s societies with the lowest levels of migrant remittances. 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 10 
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 
2000 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
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By 2000 (in Figure 10), we see a truly different map. Ukraine has moved up 
(going from 0.013% to 0.105%, showing a 7.8-fold jump in four years). Kyr-
gyzstan and Azerbaijan both show similar upswings, putting Kyrgyzstan just 
below the global median, slightly trailing behind Kazakhstan and just above 
Russia and Belarus. Estonia, the wealthiest state in this group, continues with 
remarkably low levels of MRD. Among the high-MRD states, Moldova and 
Georgia (GE) are at the top, followed by Armenia and Latvia. 
 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 11 
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 
2005 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
The period of 2000 to 2005 (including, again, the momentous enlargement of 
the European Union, bringing, from this group, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
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into the organization) shows a great flux. During this time, as Figure 11 suggests, 
Estonia moved from far beneath to almost exactly on the global median (a jump 
of 26.7 times, from 0.071% to 1.899%), putting it considerably above the regres-
sion line as well. By the mid-2000s, Kyrgyzstan had also been catapulted into the 
high-MRD category, next to Tajikistan (TJ) and Moldova. Azerbaijan also be-
came a high-MRD state during this period. Ukraine has continued its upward 
trajectory. By way of a movement in the opposite direction, Georgia’s (GE) 
MRD decreased, but it still remained within the high-MRD category, while Rus-
sia and Kazakhstan (KZ) experienced a considerable drop in their MRD. 
 
 
Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 12 
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 
2008 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
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By 2008 (see Figure 12), the polarization of the successor states of the 
USSR had become complete. With a full 49.3% of its GDP coming from mi-
grant remittances, Tajikistan held the world record in remittance dependency 
for 2008. Moldova and Kyrgyzstan follow suit, with 31.3% and 24%, respec-
tively. Ukraine has finally shot into the high-MRD category so that, all other 
successor states of the former USSR except Russia and Kazakhstan are above 
the regression line. Of the latter group, Estonia, Lithuania (LV) and Belarus are 
on the global median, the rest are considerably above it.  Russia and Kazakh-
stan – two heavily energy- and raw-materials-export-dependent economies of 
the former USSR that saw considerable international revenue increases due to 
the consistently high energy prices during the last decade and a half – are the 
only two in the low-MRD category.  
Finally, the last graph (Figure 13) plots all post-state-socialist states against 
the background of the world distribution for 2008.47 This presentation allows us 
to gain a visual sense of the current position of the post-state-socialist former-
”bloc” as a whole in the global system of migrant remittances.  
Two things are particularly noteworthy about this image. First, and most 
suggestive, the larger dark circles representing the post-state-socialist societies 
of the former Soviet-”bloc” have by and large come to be in the top quintile of 
the global distribution of MRD, almost completely irrespective of their position 
in the global distribution of income. Tajikistan, Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Armenia are in fact exactly on the very top edge of the distribution of the 
world’s states, sharing this area only with only such states as Lesotho (LS), 
Lebanon (RL) and Jordan (HKJ),48 known for their extremely high dependence 
on migrant remittances. Observing the global distribution, even in the second 
top “layer” we find such post-state-socialist societies as Kyrgyzstan, Albania, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Latvia. 
 Figure 13 also indicates49 the positions of those “third-world” states that 
had undergone a socialist transformation at some point in their histories but – 
except for Mongolia – protracted anti-colonial liberation struggles and other 
wars dominated their socialist history. The list includes Angola (AO), Cambo-
dia (KM), Mongolia (MNG), Mozambique (MZ) and Laos (LA). As Figure 10 
clearly suggests, only Mongolia and Cambodia are above the global median 
and on or above the regression line; the others are very clearly in the low-MRD 
category. Overall, none of them show the record-high levels of MRD that east-
ern Europe and northern Eurasia does. 
 
 
47
 The post-state-socialist states are marked by full circles in the graphs. 
48
 Lesotho, Lebanon and Jordan are marked by X signs in the graph. 
49
 These states are marked by transparent squares. 
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Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012. 
 
Figure 13 
MRD by relative wealth, all post-state-socialist states and states of the world, 
2008 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap) 
 
Finally, Figure 13 also includes a transparent circle marking the Philippines 
(PHI). The Philippines offers an important point of orientation because its gov-
ernment has maintained, for a generation now, very strong pro-migration- and, 
more important, pro-migrant-remittance policies. This is so much so that it is 
accurate to characterize the Philippines, as Robyn Magalit Rodriguez (2010) 
does, as “a labour-brokering state.” The Philippine government trains selected 
groups of its citizens in specific skill areas, promotes the life strategy of work-
ing abroad as a service to the nation, acts as an agent and a representative of 
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sorts for them in lieu of trade unions and, most important, it makes concerted 
efforts to enable Philippine citizen migrants to return and repatriate their earn-
ings. In other words, the Philippines ought to be seen as a society in the global 
South whose government is strongly focused on promoting a high level of mi-
grant remittances. 
As Figure 13 reveals, with its concerted efforts, the Philippine government 
has managed to achieve a 10.7% level in migrant remittances. Of the group of 
post-state-socialist states, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Albania all receive greater proportions of their GDP from 
remittances, and Armenia is not lagging too far behind. This should help con-
textualize globally the condition of labour exports in the post-Soviet-“bloc.” 
 
 
5  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We can isolate three distinct MRD patterns in the post-Soviet context. They 
are: 
− “Global South”-like poor post-state-socialist economies with high MRD 
throughout the period under study (Tajikistan, Albania, Moldova); 
− Medium-to-high MRD early on, followed by precipitous drops (Slove-
nia, Czech Republic, Russia, Kazakhstan); 
− Systematic “march” upward, populating the top quintile in the global 
plot of remittance dependency (all others, both in Eastern Europe and the for-
mer USSR). 
The by now quarter-of-a-century-old critique of “push-pull” theories, quot-
ed above, argued that, by themselves, global inequalities in income levels fail to 
explain the manifold complexities of international migration. The wide disper-
sion of the world’s societies in terms of the share of migrant remittances in 
GDP, after controlling for per capita GDP above, strongly confirmed this cri-
tique. 
Examination of the recent experiences of the post-Soviet states added an-
other layer to that critique of the “push-pull” model. For, it is not just that rela-
tive income levels do not fully explain the variation in remittance levels; the 
world’s societies can, and as the post-state-socialist trajectories indicate, very 
much do, move in the global system along the dimension of remittance depend-
ency. The empirical task for the researcher is, hence, not simply locating a posi-
tion but following the trajectories of (groups of) societies. 
The experience of post-state-socialist societies suggests, clearly, that there is 
movement in the system. In some exceptional cases that movement can be quite 
extreme, involving greater than twenty-fold increases in the percentages of the 
GDP accounted for by migrant remittances over relatively short periods of three 
to five years. Only a small subgroup of the world’s post-state-socialist societies 
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(Albania, Moldova and Tajikistan) show evidence of having begun their post-
socialist involvement in global labour exports at levels comparable to the most 
remittance-dependent poor societies of the world. Practically all other erst-
while-state-socialist societies examined here travelled quite a distance in the 
analytical graph. Most of them proceeded upward. This makes the cases of the 
three or four low-MRD exceptions (each of which began at higher levels and 
“descended” over time) that much more noteworthy for analytical purposes. 
To recap, the post-state-socialist societies of the former-Soviet-“bloc” have 
recently become highly dependent on migrant remittances, almost completely 
irrespective of their level of income. There are two sets of exceptions from this 
regularity. Slovenia and the Czech Republic came down from their initial, mid-
to-high-MRD to the regression line during this period, while Russia and Ka-
zakhstan descended from medium-to low to really low levels of MRD (below 
both the “push-pull” regression line and the global median).   
By the end of the period under study, almost all former-state-socialist-
“bloc” have shown evidence of specialisation in high dependence on migrant 
remittances. This is a unique, specific, and, thus far, at least to this author, un-
known finding. The implications of the sudden and unique move of the socie-
ties of (South-) Eastern Europe and Northern Eurasia to this particular kind of 
specialisation will require much more analytical space than what is available in 
the framework of this paper. 
The inclusion of Mongolia and the non-contiguous, “former-third-world” 
former-state-socialist states (as it is done in Figure 13) offers an additional clue 
pointing toward a possible explanation for this striking empirical regularity. 
Because of the absence of high MRD among the latter group, the simple “post-
state-socialism” explanation (one that would argue that specialization on high 
levels of MRD is somehow caused by the post-state-socialist transformation 
per se – i.e., a combination of a transition to a more formal multiparty political 
system with the constitutional guarantees for private capital ownership –  does 
not hold by itself.  
I do not have a firm alternative explanation to offer in this preliminary anal-
ysis. However, I will venture to say that this difference may have something to 
do with combinations of factors such as the historical legacies of Soviet-style 
state-socialist policies (industrialization, education, urbanization, collective and 
individual class mobility, including proletarianisation, etc., during the state 
socialist period) and the geopolitical presence of two large economies – the 
European Union and Russia – with intense needs, for their own distinct reasons, 
for industrially socialized, educated, urbanized and proletarianised and ex-
tremely inexpensive labour. In other words, my point is that neither the “transi-
tion to democracy,” nor property change, nor the mere cheapness of labour 
explain these extremely high levels of MRD by themselves. 
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We could get closer to an understanding of the full complexity of the story 
by way of a much more detailed examination of the histories of each of these 
societies in terms of their participation in the Eurasian labour migration sys-
tems. It is also important to note that the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Russia and 
perhaps even Kazakhstan had emerged, during the post-state-socialist period, as 
strongly migrant-attracting economies, and it stands to reason that the condi-
tions that attract foreign citizens to work there might work as factors that help 
persuade their own citizens not to seek employment abroad. 
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